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Preferences for redistribution 
- A country comparison of fairness judgements  
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper seeks to explain within- and between-country variation in redistributive preferences 
in terms of self-interest concerns and an input-based concept of fairness, which we examine by 
looking at the effects of beliefs regarding the causes of income differences. Results of 
estimations based on data for 25 countries indicate that both factors are indeed important 
determinants of redistribution support, in line with hypothesised patterns. We find that while 
differences in beliefs on what causes income differences seem to be important for explaining 
within-country variation in redistributive preferences, they do little to explain between-country 
differences. Differences in the effects of holding certain beliefs, however, are important for 
explaining between-country variation in redistributive preferences, suggesting considerable 
heterogeneity across societies in what is considered as fair.   
 
 
JEL classification: D63, D31, D01 
Keywords: Redistribution preferences; fairness. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Rational economic self-interest fails to explain the wide spread in support for income 
redistribution.
1
 Judging from standard economic reasoning, according to which 
individuals are motivated by self-interested utility maximization, this is puzzling. 
However, based on a vast experimental literature there is a growing consensus that people 
are motivated by forces other than self-interest, and particularly so by fairness 
considerations.
2
  
One could in this context make a distinction between fairness concepts focusing only 
on outcomes, such as strict egalitarianism,
3
 and those accounting for individual inputs 
contributing to those outcomes. The general idea that the fair distribution should depend 
on individual inputs is well established, both in the normative literature on justice and in 
positive analyses of what people consider to be just. According to equity theory dating 
back to social psychologist Adams (1965), people expect their outcome of some exchange 
to be correlated
4
 to inputs seen as relevant for that exchange, such as effort, skills and 
talent. Which inputs are considered relevant and how correlated individuals wish these 
inputs to be to the outcome should according to Adams depend on societal norms that 
individuals learn by socialisation. Dworkin (1981a, b), and later Roemer (2002), 
distinguish between inputs for which the individual could be considered directly 
responsible – ‘responsible inputs’, and those that are beyond the individual’s control – 
‘arbitrary inputs’, and argue that fair distributions should be based on responsible inputs 
                                                 
 We would like to thank two anonymous referees, Olof Johansson-Stenman, Arne Bigsten, Karl Ove 
Moene, colleagues at University of Gothenburg, and seminar participants at the First Nordic Workshop on 
Behavioural and Experimental Economics in Oslo 2006, the workshop Equality: Theory, Political Economy, 
and Prospects in Bergen 2007, and at the 2007 EEA conference in Budapest for valuable suggestions and 
discussion.   
1
 See for example Fong et al. (2005). 
2
 See for example Burrows and Loomes (1994), Cappelen et al.  (2007) and Clark (1998).  
3
 See also the influential inequality aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), or fairness concepts 
stressing basic needs. See Konow (2003) for a good discussion of different fairness ideals. 
4
 Interpreting Adam’s equity theory in a strict sense, outcomes should even be proportional to inputs. For 
experimental evidence on this theme, see for example Van Dijk and Wilke (1994) or Clark (1998). 
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 2 
only. If people in their fairness judgements actually distinguish between inputs in this 
fashion, then those who believe that income determinants to a greater degree are 
‘responsible’ should consider the prevailing income distribution fairer and thus be less 
inclined to support redistribution, whereas those who to a larger extent view them as 
‘arbitrary’ should see the existing income differences as more unfair and accordingly be 
more supportive of redistribution.
5
  
With respect to empirical estimation of redistributive preferences, these arguments 
first of all motivate going beyond standard economic self-interest explanations. More 
specifically, they point to the importance of incorporating individual beliefs about the 
causes of income differences, and in particular beliefs on income determinants that could 
be seen as being under varying degrees of individual control. Second, they highlight the 
importance of studying preferences for redistribution in a country comparative 
framework. Whether or not due to actual variation in what determines final incomes, 
beliefs about the causes of income differences are likely to vary across societies.
6
 This 
should create corresponding differences in redistribution support. Similarly, judgements 
on the extent to which perceived income determinants are under individual control are 
likely to vary among individuals and communities. This variation too could be due to 
differences in norms as well as in actual circumstances. Regardless of which, the 
implication is that the relationship between beliefs about the causes of income differences 
and redistributive preferences is likely to vary with context, and not the least across 
countries, thus highlighting the importance of allowing for cross-country parameter 
heterogeneity.
7
 
Against this background, this paper seeks to explain within- and between-country 
variation in redistributive preferences in terms of both self-interest concerns and an input-
based concept of fairness captured by beliefs about the causes of income differences, 
allowing the effect of beliefs to differ among countries. More specifically, we will address 
the following two hypotheses: 
 
i. Both economic self-interest and an input-based fairness concept, where 
individuals judge the fairness of income determinants according to their 
perceived degree of ‘responsibility’, matter for redistributive preferences.  
 
ii. Differences in beliefs about income determinants and differences in the effects 
of these beliefs both contribute to explain the cross-country variation in 
preferences for redistribution. 
 
Several papers demonstrate reasons why a person’s redistributive preferences do not 
necessarily correspond to his or her current pecuniary interest. Perceived prospects of 
future upward mobility and risks of future downward mobility may imply that a poor 
                                                 
5
 Cappelen and Tungodden (2006) add some nuance to this general claim, showing that if there are negative 
correlations between different non-responsibility (what we refer to as arbitrary) factors, one cannot expect a 
monotonic relationship between the responsibility assigned to people and the ideal level of redistribution. 
However, the general formulation put forward here should still hold.  
6
 One reason for this variation could be differences in the redistributive policies pursued by the countries in 
question, in turn giving country variation in perceived and/or actual income earning possibilities (see for 
example the article on multiple welfare states equilibriums by Alesina and Angeletos, 2005). Whether 
country differences in beliefs about the causes of income differences are due to actual variation in what 
determines final incomes is an interesting question, but will not be addressed in this paper. Focus lies on the 
effect of these beliefs on redistribution support, rather than on their formation. 
7
 The relationship between beliefs about the causes of income differences and redistributive preferences 
could vary between countries for several reasons, something which we get back to in section 3.2.2. 
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person sees redistribution as against her interest and that a rich person sees it as favouring 
her interests (Buchanon and Tullock, 1962; Piketty, 1995; Benabou and Ok, 2001; 
Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000). Views on the incentive costs of redistribution are also 
likely to influence preferences for redistribution (Piketty, 1995). Moreover, Corneo and 
Grüner (2000) show, theoretically and empirically, that social competition and status 
concerns can have important influences on preferences for redistribution, and make the 
middle class align with the higher class to limit redistribution.  
Explicitly relating beliefs about the causes of income differences to redistributive 
preferences is, however, a relatively new approach in the economics literature. Out of the 
few previous investigations, our study mostly resembles that of Fong (2001), who to our 
knowledge is the only one to explicitly distinguish between responsible and arbitrary 
inputs.
8
 She examines a US sample and finds beliefs about causes of income differences 
to be important (and working in the expected directions) for explaining redistributive 
preferences. A few other studies also lend support to the importance of an input-based 
concept of fairness for redistributive preferences. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and 
Piketty (1995), for example, both confirm that in the US, those who believe that society 
offers equal opportunities to people who put in effort are more averse to redistribution. 
However, if there is country variation in beliefs about what causes income differences 
and in judgements of what income determinants could be considered under individual 
control one cannot necessarily expect these results to hold outside of the United States. In 
fact, related research efforts call attention to the need for cross-country comparative work 
in the area. Based on a comparison of former East and West Germany showing that 
former East Germans are more in favour of redistribution than West Germans, even when 
controlling for their lower incomes, Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) argue that 
individuals’ preferences concerning government welfare provision are shaped by the 
economic regime in which they live. Similarly, Alesina et al. (2001) dedicate an extensive 
article to the issue of why the US does not have the same type of welfare state as Europe, 
and their evaluation does not speak to the advantage of basing conclusions of general 
attitudes towards redistribution on US evidence only.  
In spite of these concerns, the country-comparative material relating redistributive 
preferences to beliefs about the causes of income differences is meagre. To our 
knowledge, the only serious study in the area based on a more than one-country sample is 
the paper by Corneo and Grüner (2002), which looks at 12 countries. Their main focus is 
the effect of social rivalry and status concerns on preferences for redistribution.
9
 
However, they also consider, and find a significant effect of, beliefs about the importance 
of hard work for determining income, and that people in former socialist countries are 
more supportive of redistribution. However, they do not, as is done in this paper, include 
variables capturing beliefs on income determinants that could be seen as being under a 
varying degree of individual control, nor is their approach country comparative in the 
sense that it allows for cross-country parameter heterogeneity.  
This paper thus contributes to the literature by explicitly relating redistributive 
preferences to beliefs about income determinants under a varying degree of individual 
responsibility, and by doing so in a country comparative framework seeking to explain 
both within-country and between-country variations.  
 
2.  Empirical framework 
 
                                                 
8
 She refers to them as exogenous and discretionary factors. 
9
 Their key finding is that a person is more likely to favour redistribution if people that are either somewhat 
richer or somewhat poorer than them have a higher job status in relation to their own. 
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To investigate how preferences for redistribution vary within and between countries we 
use the ISSP Social Inequality III survey data set from 1999/2000 for 24 countries; 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and USA.
10
 Since preferences for 
redistribution have been shown to vary between former East and West Germany (Alesina 
and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007), Germany has been divided into its former East and West 
German regions, giving us an effective sample of 25 countries. In most countries we have 
an estimation sample of 600 to 1000 observations. The smallest samples are those of 
eastern and western Germany, with 309 and 511 observations. The largest samples are the 
French and Brazilian ones, with 1396 and 1327 observations. In the total sample we have 
20250 respondents.  
Our dependent variable is the response to the statement, ‘It is the responsibility of the 
government to reduce the difference in income between people with high incomes and 
those with low incomes’, ranging from 1 for strongly disagree to 5 for strongly agree.  In 
using this variable as our dependent, we have to make the assumption that the responses 
to the statement actually reflect the degree of redistribution that the respondents want, 
meaning that people who are more supportive of the statement also desire more 
redistribution. The fact that responses to this statement are highly correlated with 
responses to a question about the desired progressiveness or regressiveness of the tax 
system makes us more confident with regard to this assumption.
11
 As can be seen in 
Figure 1, which gives the share of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing with the 
redistributive statement in the country sub-samples, there is substantial country variation 
in support for redistribution. The share of respondents supporting the redistributive 
statement ranges from 34 percent in the US to around 91 percent in Brazil. 
 
<<FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE>> 
 
Turning to our explanatory variables, these could be divided into three major categories: 
pecuniary self-interest variables, indicators on beliefs about the causes of income 
differences included to capture the potential influence of input-based fairness concerns, 
and control variables. With regard to the former, an individual should according to 
economic thinking want the level of redistribution that maximises the utility derived from 
his/her current and expected future income. With redistribution going from the ‘rich’ to 
the ‘poor’, support for redistribution should thus be decreasing in both current and 
expected future relative income. Moreover, it is possible to view redistribution as 
insurance against income risk. A more risk-averse person should then prefer more 
redistribution and vice versa, and similarly someone with a high perceived income risk 
should prefer more redistribution and vice versa. Due to data limitations, however, 
expected future income, risk aversion and perceived income risk are omitted; leaving us 
with relative income
12
 to capture self-interest.  
                                                 
10
 Austria, Bulgaria, Great Britain, Israel, Netherlands, and Northern Ireland are excluded since key 
variables are missing. 
11
 The reason why we do not use the tax question as our dependent variable is the much smaller variation 
over the five response categories for this question.  Extremely few want high income earners to pay a 
smaller or much smaller share in taxes than low income earners, and these alternatives constitute two of the 
five response categories. 
12
 Household income per adult equivalent divided by the country sample average. Note that the difference 
between relative income and absolute income is only relevant in pooled sample estimations including all 
four countries.  
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Other socio-demographic variables, such as class affiliation and higher education, 
could also be seen as considered to capturing self-interest, but might just as well capture 
differences associated with fairness concerns. Just as a more homogenous group is likely 
to be more equal in terms of omitted self-interest variables (such as expected future 
income), it seems reasonable that they also have more similar beliefs about how much an 
omitted ‘input’ does and should contribute to income. This ambiguity makes it more 
suitable to view the included socio-demographic indicators as controls for omitted 
variables rather than as factors in themselves capturing the influence of either fairness or 
self-interest concerns. The socio-demographic variables included on top of relative 
income are level of education, father’s education, self-reported class belonging, sex and 
age.  
Furthermore, we include a dummy controlling for potential concerns over incentives 
effects of redistribution (indicating whether the respondent agrees with the statement, 
‘Large differences in income are necessary for [country’s] prosperity’.13 The pooled 
sample estimations also include country dummies to capture unexplained country 
differences in redistribution support. 
To evaluate the potential influence of an input-based fairness concept where 
individuals judge the fairness of income determinants according to their perceived degree 
of ‘responsibility’, we need to include variables capturing beliefs about the importance of 
income determinants that are arguably under a varying degree of individual control.
14
 As 
noted, views on the degree to which an input could be seen as ‘responsible’ are likely to 
differ among individuals. Some inputs, however, are easier to classify than others. Effort, 
for example, is often put forward as being largely under individual control, whereas 
factors associated with birth conditions, such as family background, could hardly be seen 
as something controllable by the individual. Inputs such as intelligence, skills or talents 
seem to be more controversial. We include three variables to capture beliefs about the 
importance of certain factors for determining income differences in society: one looks at 
beliefs about the importance of effort (arguably a responsible factor), another has to do 
with the importance of family background (arguably an arbitrary factor outside of 
individual control), and the third captures the perceived importance of intelligence and 
skills.
15
  How to categorise the latter in terms of ‘responsibility’ is less clear-cut,16 why 
the impact of this belief variable on redistributive preferences should be equally 
ambiguous and thereby occupy a middle position between the effects of the other two 
belief variables. For variable definitions see Table A1.  
Since our dependent variable is discrete and inherently ordered, we use ordered probit 
for estimation according to the benchmark setup given in equation 1: 
                                                 
13
 It would be possible to follow Corneo and Grüner (2002) and control for the effect of status concerns on 
preferences for redistribution. Following their approach would, however, involve dropping observations 
from the richest and poorest income group, decreasing the representativeness of our sample and the 
variation in a key variable. Since status concerns is not our focus we choose not to do this.  
14
 Some authors make a clear distinction between arbitrary and responsible inputs (see for example 
Cappelen and Tungodden 2006, who refer to a strict ‘responsibility cut’). We believe that speaking in terms 
of different degrees of responsibility over inputs, where completely arbitrary and entirely responsible are the 
two extremes, better reflect popular opinions in this context. 
15
 The belief variables are based on questions asking how important the factor is ‘for getting ahead’, or on 
agreement with a statement saying that the factor is ‘rewarded’ in society (see Table A1).  Although these 
formulations could be interpreted in non-monetary terms, we still believe that the answers constitute good 
approximations of beliefs about factors underlying monetary success. Hence we speak of these variables as 
concerning beliefs about the causes of income/income differences.  
16
 Adding to this ambiguity is the dubious nature of the variable formulation. The statement captures both 
intelligence and skills, and many might argue that these two characteristics vary in terms of the extent to 
which they are acquired through life and thereby in the degree to which they are under individual control. 
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(1)         iciccicciccic yPR xδbβ
~  
 
icPR  gives the unobserved redistributive preference of individual i in country c, icy
~  
captures individual relative income, icb is the vector of belief variables, icx  is the vector 
of control variables, and ic  is a standard normally distributed error term. The probability 
that individual i in country c chooses response alternative k is the probability that the 
value of the unobserved support for redistribution falls between the cut-points 1k  and 
k . Assuming normally distributed error terms with mean zero and variance 1, and 
denoting the normal cumulative distribution function , these are:  
 
(2)   
.4,3,2,~1)5Pr(
,~~)Pr(
,~)1Pr(
4
1
1
kyy
yyky
yy
iccicciccic
icciccicckicciccicckic
iccicciccic
xδbβ
xδbβxδbβ
xδbβ
 
 
Regression coefficients and cut-points are estimated by the maximum likelihood 
estimator. When the coefficient is positive, a positive change in the independent variable 
decreases the probability of the lowest ranked outcome and increases the probability of 
the highest ranked outcome, but does not reveal the direction of change in probabilities of 
intermediate outcomes. To be able to say something about the direction of change for 
intermediate outcomes, as well as of magnitudes of changes, we present the effects of 
given discrete changes in the independent variables on the probabilities of observing the 
different outcomes on our dependent variable. For a dummy variable D  this is simply 
calculated as )Pr( kicy evaluated at 1D  minus )Pr( kicy evaluated at 0D , 
keeping the remaining variables at their means. Analogously, for the effect of a given 
change in a continuous variable X, )Pr( kicy  is evaluated at two specified values of X.  
 
3. Results 
 
In this section we evaluate our two hypotheses empirically. We start by examining our 
first hypothesis, considering the extent to which economic self-interest considerations and 
input-based fairness conc rns can help explain redistributive preferences. Then we turn to 
our second hypothesis, suggesting that both differences in beliefs about income 
determinants and differences in the effects of these beliefs contribute to explain the cross-
country variation in redistributive preferences. 
 
3.1 Explaining preferences for redistribution 
 
Our first hypothesis can be evaluated by considering the results of the benchmark 
estimation given in equation 1, estimated separately for each country as well as for the full 
sample with country dummies. The first part of this hypothesis, stipulating that self-
interest considerations should matter for redistributive preferences, implies that a higher 
relative income should give a lower support for redistribution, so that 0c . The 
analysis of the second part of the hypothesis, arguing that the effect of beliefs about the 
causes of income differences differs with the respective inputs’ degree of responsibility, 
rests on accepting the suggested classification of effort as the most ‘responsible’ input out 
of the three considered, family background as the least responsible, and intelligence/skills 
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as a less clear-cut one located somewhere between the other two. Then with regard to 
believing that the concerned inputs are important for determining income, we should have  
family
c
skills
c
effort
c , 0
effort
c  and 0
family
c .  
Table 1 presents the marginal effects from the pooled sample ordered probit 
estimation of equation 1. Figure 2-5 summarise the results of estimation of equation 1 for 
our 25 country sub-samples, focusing on the effects of movements in our key variables – 
the belief and relative income indicators. 
 
<<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE>> 
 
Let us start by briefly commenting on the pooled sample effects of our control variables 
(Table 1). As noted in Section 2, omitted belief and self-interest variables makes the 
parameters of the socio-demographic controls somewhat difficult to interpret; do they 
reflect differences in norms and beliefs among different groups in society, or do they 
capture self-interest considerations? At any rate, a number of interesting patterns stand 
out. Respondents with higher education, respondents whose fathers have higher 
education, and respondents claiming to belong to the upper class all tend to be less 
supportive of redistribution (the reverse is true for those who claim to belong to the 
working class). This could reflect higher expected future relative incomes given current 
relative income for well-educated people with steeper age-earnings profiles, or that 
privileged classes have better professional connections and thus face smaller income risks, 
but could also depend on differences in norms between social groups. Similarly, the fact 
that women are more likely to support the redistributive statement could reflect a higher 
perceived income risk among women, a greater degree of risk-aversion or alternatively 
that women hold different norms regarding what is fair. Moreover, there is a positive age 
effect on support for the redistributive statement, perhaps reflecting a change over time in 
popular sentiments towards redistribution. In what follows these socio-demographic 
variables will be treated as controls for omitted self-interest and belief indicators. The 
estimation also includes 24 country dummies, where USA, the country with the least 
support for redistribution, is the reference category. The country effects, all statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level, are not presented in Table 1, but to get a feeling for their 
size see Figure 9, Specification 2. In short, the largest country effects are found in the 
former socialist countries (in line with the findings of Corneo and Grüner, 2002), in four 
countries with a recent history of right-wing authoritarian regimes – Brazil, Chile, 
Portugal, and Spain – and in France.17 Finally, and as expected, people who claim 
inequality is needed for prosperity – a variable included to control for concerns about 
possible incentive effects of redistribution – are less supportive of redistribution.  
Turning to our self-interest variable, the results of the pooled sample estimation 
indicate that, as expected, people with a higher relative income tend to be less supportive 
of redistribution. However, the effect is quite small. Conditional on our belief- and socio-
demographic variables, an increase in relative income from one-half median absolute 
deviation below the median to one-half median absolute deviation above the median 
involves a one percentage point reduction in the probability of supporting the 
redistributive statement. Considering the relative income effects in the individual country 
sub-samples (Figure 2), in the great majority of countries a higher relative income is 
associated with a statistically significant smaller probability to support redistribution. The 
associations are far from homogenous, however. In Canada, the concerned relative 
                                                 
17
 Log-likelihood ratio tests show that the class variables, as well as the country dummies, are jointly 
important (the test statistics are 274.44 and 2533.11, giving p-values at 0.000). 
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income change involves a 7 percentage point smaller probability to support redistribution. 
In Hungary the equivalent reduction is around 1 percentage point, i.e. in line with our 
pooled sample estimate. In 8 countries the relative income effect is not statistically 
different from zero. 
 
<<FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE>> 
 
Turning to the effects of holding certain beliefs about what causes income differences, the 
pooled sample estimates (Table 1) indicate that the belief effects follow the hypothesised 
pattern. Believing that coming from a wealthy family is important to get ahead (the 
reference categories capture believing that the respective inputs are not 
important/rewarded, see Table A1) is, as anticipated, associated with stronger support for 
redistribution. In the pooled sample, it involves an 8 percentage point increase in the 
probability of supporting the redistributive statement, to be compared with the 1 
percentage point reduction in the same probability associated with the relative income 
change.  Also in line with our hypothesis, believing that effort is rewarded comes with a 6 
percentage point lower probability to support the redistributive statement. Similarly, 
believing that intelligence/skills are rewarded involves a 2 percentage point lower 
probability to support the statement. Hence, the pooled sample belief effects vary 
according to the pattern ( familyc
skills
c
effort
c ), 0
effort
c and 0
family
c  suggested by 
the respective inputs’ degree of responsibility. However, looking at the individual country 
sub-samples reveals considerable heterogeneity. 
 
<<FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE>> 
 
In the majority of our country sub-samples believing that coming from a wealthy family is 
important to get ahead is associated with a statistically significant higher probability to 
support redistribution (Figure 3). The size of the effect varies across countries, however; 
holding the belief involves a 4 percentage point higher probability to support 
redistribution in Portugal and a 22 percentage point higher probability to do so in 
Australia.  
 
<<FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE>> 
 
The effects of believing effort is  rewarded (Figure 4) are somewhat less clear-cut, but all 
statistically significant effects (seven countries) are negative – the decrease ranging from 
4 percentage points in Portugal to 15 in the US.  
 
<<FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE>> 
 
As hypothesised, the effects of beliefs on rewards to intelligence and skills are most 
ambiguous. As seen in Figure 5 believing that intelligence/skills is rewarded involves a 
statistically significant (2-14 percentage point) lower probability to support redistribution 
in Cyprus, Canada, Ireland and Brazil, and an 11 percentage point higher probability to do 
so in Denmark.  
To formally test the joint importance of the belief variables, we perform log 
likelihood ratio tests where the unrestricted model includes them and the restricted model 
does not (See Table A2, Panel 1).  The null-hypothesis, that excluding the belief variables 
does not affect the explanatory power of the model, can be firmly rejected in the absolute 
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majority of country sub-samples. Only in three countries (Chile, Slovenia and 
Switzerland) can we not reject the null.   
To test not only if the belief variables matter, but if they do so in line with the pattern 
expected from the respective inputs degree of ‘responsibility’, we perform a number of 
one-sided tests to evaluate if the parameters follow the hypothesised pattern 
family
c
skills
c
effort
c , 0
effort
c and 0
family
c  (see Table A3). The pooled sample 
tests confirm the hypothesised pattern. In the individual countries the picture is somewhat 
more mixed. Our hypothesis that the effect of believing family background to be rewarded 
has a positive effect on support for redistribution, and that this is larger than the effects of 
effort and intelligence/skills, is supported in the absolute majority of the country sub-
samples. Our hypothesis that believing effort to be rewarded has a negative effect on 
redistribution support is confirmed in 12 of our country samples. For both family and 
effort, where we cannot reject the null we cannot reject the alternative hypothesis either. 
We find least support for the hypothesis that the intelligence/skills effect is larger than the 
effort effect, which is confirmed only in four countries. In two countries the test actually 
indicates the reverse, that the effort effect is larger than the intelligence/skills effect.
18
 
 
3.1.1 Omitted variables 
 
When interpreting the results one has to consider the potential influence of omitted self-
interest and belief variables on our key parameters. Variables that appear important in this 
context include the self-interest indicators expected future relative income, risk-aversion 
and perceived income risks, and variables capturing beliefs regarding the importance of a 
wide range of inputs which could affect income, for example luck, ethnicity and gender. 
Since self-interest indicators and beliefs about the causes of income are likely to vary 
among social groups, the included socio-demographic variables should pick up much of 
this variation, thus helping to alleviate the problem. Nevertheless, the issue deserves some 
attention.  
First, the relative income estimate may be biased by omitted self-interest variables. 
For example, expected future income should be positively correlated with current relative 
income. If we assume that support for redistribution depends on some weighted average 
of current and expected future income, then the estimated relative income coefficient will 
be larger than its true effect as it also captures some of the effects from expected future 
income.  
Another potential concern is if omitted belief variables are correlated with relative 
income, which, if we are interested in isolating the effect of relative income that is due to 
direct self-interest concerns, could bias the estimated relative income effect. Similarly, 
omitted self-interest variables could bias the estimated effects of our belief variables.
19
 
Again, if omitted beliefs and self-interest variables vary across social groups the socio-
demographic variables should pick up much of this unobserved variation. For what 
remains, we naturally cannot investigate the covariations between relative income and 
omitted belief variables, or between omitted self-interest variables and our belief 
variables. What we can do is to evaluate the correlation pattern between relative income 
and our included belief variables, hoping that the latter reveals something about the 
former; if there is little correlation between included belief variables and relative income 
                                                 
18
 The tests of the alternative hypotheses are not presented, but are available from the authors.  
19
 Of course, omitted beliefs could also bias the estimated effects of the included beliefs. We see this as less 
of a problem, since then we can assign the effects of belief variables to fairness considerations rather than to 
self-interest concerns.  
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it seems less likely that we have a problem of correlation between omitted belief variables 
and relative income, or between omitted self interest variables and our included belief 
variables. As it turns out, there is very low correlation between our relative income 
indicator and our belief variables. In the pooled sample, correlation coefficients (in 
absolute terms) range between 0.001 and 0.047. Moreover, testing for multicollinearity of 
regressors using variance inflation factors and the condition index shows that neither in 
the pooled sample nor in the country sub-samples do we have a problem of 
multicollinearity (the variance inflation factors are in the order of 1-2 and the condition 
numbers range from 2-5).  
Still, to get a picture of whether relative income affects the beliefs regarding income 
determinants we run ordered probit regressions with the belief indicators as dependent 
variables and with relative income and the socio-demographic controls as independent 
variables (see Tables A4-A6), for the pooled sample as well as the individual country sub-
samples. In the pooled sample there is actually a relative income effect on our family and 
effort variables. However, the effect is very small; a relative income increase of one 
median absolute deviation around the median involves a 0.3 percentage point smaller 
probability to believe that coming from a wealthy family is very important or essential to 
get ahead, and a 0.2 percentage point smaller probability to agree or strongly agree that 
effort is rewarded. Moreover, in the absolute majority of country sub-samples the effect of 
relative income is far from statistically significant. For none of the belief variables more 
than 4 out of 25 countries have significant relative income effects, and for the ones that 
do, the effects are again small.
20
 If we exclude the countries (Brazil, France, Hungary, 
Latvia and Russia) where a statistically significant relative income effect is found for two 
belief variables and run a restricted pooled sample estimation, the relative income effect is 
no longer there, suggesting that the associations identified in the original pooled sample 
estimation were driven by a small number of countries differing from the overall pattern 
rather than by increased precision following from more observations. Hence, with the 
exception of a few countries, we identify no effect of relative income on our belief 
variables. If the same goes for the omitted belief variables, then their influence should not 
be a major problem.  
An alternative approach could be to argue that the stability of the relative income 
effect to the inclusion of the belief variables might indicate whether omitted belief 
variables constitute a problem. Estimating our benchmark model (equation 1) with and 
without the belief variables
21
 it turns out that in the pooled sample as well as in all the 
country sub-samples the relative income parameter is very stable.  
Summing up, problems of omitted variables make it difficult to pin down the exact 
magnitudes of the effects found. We can nevertheless conclude that on the whole, our 
relative income indicator appear to capture self interest considerations and our belief 
variables fairness concerns. Our estimations suggest that both relative income and beliefs 
about the causes of income differences are important to explain redistributive preferences, 
and that they do so according to the pattern suggested in Hypothesis 1. We can, at this 
stage, also note that there is substantial country variation in redistributive preferences, as 
well as in the effects of our main explanatory variables on these. In the next section we 
investigate this variation further. 
 
3.2 Explaining country variation in redistributive preferences 
                                                 
20
 A relative income increase of one median absolute deviation around the median in most cases involves a 
smaller than one (and never more than 1.7) percentage point change in the probability to support the 
concerned statements.  
21
 The results are available from the authors. 
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Our second hypothesis stipulates that differences in beliefs about the causes of income 
differences, as well as differences in the effects of these beliefs, contribute to explain the 
cross-country variation in redistributive preferences. We will evaluate this hypothesis in 
three steps. First, we consider whether beliefs about the causes of income differences 
differ across countries in a direction consistent with the country variation in redistributive 
support. Second, we examine whether there is cross-country heterogeneity in the effects 
of holding certain beliefs regarding what causes income differences on redistributive 
preferences. Finally, we bring the picture together by addressing the extent to which the 
discussed differences in beliefs and impacts of these beliefs can explain the observed 
country variation in redistributive preferences.  
 
3.2.1 Country differences in beliefs about income determinants 
 
Let us start by considering the country variation in beliefs about what causes income 
differences. Figures 6-8 give the country shares of respondents who believe that coming 
from a wealthy family is important to get ahead, or agree to that effort and 
intelligence/skills are rewarded in the country. As expected, there is substantial country 
variation in beliefs about income determinants. The share of respondents who believe that 
it is important to be from a wealthy family to get ahead ranges from 8 percent in Denmark 
to 62 percent in Poland. For the beliefs about whether effort and intelligence/skills are 
rewarded, the lowest shares of respondents believing so are found in Russia, where 8 and 
10 percent agree with the respective statements, and the highest in the US, where the 
equivalent shares are 67 and 75 percent. 
 
<<FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE>> 
<<FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE>> 
<<FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE>> 
 
The above shares give an overview of the country variation in beliefs about the causes of 
income differences, but do not inform us about the full variation in the belief distributions. 
To formally test whether the distributions of beliefs differ between countries we perform 
two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of equal cumulative distribution functions.
22
  We 
compare each country with the remaining countries for the three belief variables, resulting 
in 975 tests. The null-hypothesis of equal cumulative distribution functions was rejected 
at the five percent level of significance in 938 tests. To draw any conclusions about 
similarity of distributions in the special cases where we cannot reject the null of equal 
distributions, a test with an exact p-value would be necessary. Overall it seems fair to say 
that beliefs about the causes of income differences vary across countries.  
With effort being classified as the most and family background as the least responsible 
input, one would predict that the countries that to a greater extent believe that effort is 
rewarded in society and that family background is not very important for getting ahead 
will also be the ones least supportive of redistribution (and vice versa). Inspection of 
Figure 1 and Figures 6-8 lends some support to this hypothesis. USA, the country where 
believing that effort is rewarded is most common (Figure 7), is also the country with the 
                                                 
22
 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is non-parametric and sensitive to differences in both the location of the 
distribution and the shape of the distribution. It is designed for testing the distribution of continuous 
variables, but has been demonstrated to be applicable to discrete random variables too, in which case it is 
conservative; i.e. for a given level of significance the null hypothesis of equal empirical distributions will be 
rejected less or as often as with the exact true test statistic (Conover, 1999; Goodman, 1954; Noether, 1963).  
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least support for redistribution (Figure 1). Other countries where the belief that effort is 
rewarded is common are the Philippines, Denmark, Australia, Germany (west) and 
Canada, all of which have comparatively low support for redistribution. Respondents in 
the former socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe are generally very sceptical 
of the claim that effort is rewarded, while at the same time showing strong support for 
redistribution. A similar pattern can be observed for beliefs concerning the rewards to 
intelligence and skills (Figure 8).  
Believing that it is important to be from a wealthy family to get ahead (Figure 6) is 
most common in Poland, Cyprus, Portugal and Spain, and at least Poland, Portugal and 
Spain display comparatively strong support for redistribution. Correspondingly, in 
countries where respondents do not believe that family background is very important for 
getting ahead - Denmark, Norway, France, Japan and Canada – the support for 
redistribution is comparatively low. At this stage it thus seems as though country 
differences in beliefs about income differences could have some relevance for explaining 
cross-country differences in redistribution support. 
 
3.2.2 Country differences in the effects of beliefs about income determinants 
 
Let us now turn to the second step, where we evaluate possible cross-country 
heterogeneity in the effects of the belief variables on redistributive preferences. Figures 3-
5, presenting the effects of belief variables on redistribution support in the respective 
countries, suggest such heterogeneity to be present. As noted, believing it to be important 
to be from a wealthy family to get ahead is for the great majority of countries associated 
with a higher probability to support redistribution. The largest effects of holding this 
belief are found in the US, Australia, Denmark and Norway, where it implies an 
approximate 20 percentage point increase in the probability of supporting the 
redistributive statement. However, in a few countries – Brazil, Canada, Chile, Czech 
Republic, Germany (west), Slovenia, and Spain- the effect is comparatively small and 
statistically insignificant. According to the reasoning in this paper, this fact could be 
interpreted as people from these countries assigning some degree of individual 
responsibility over family background. While it is difficult to argue that people can affect 
which family they are born into, the argument that someone who has succeeded in 
creating wealth should be able to pass this on to his/her children is quite common. The 
degree of responsibility assigned to an input may not necessarily depend only on 
perceived individual control over that input; conceivably it could also depend on 
perceived control within a larger entity, such as the family.
23
 An alternative interpretation 
could be that in these countries people are more libertarian in the sense that they believe a 
person is entitled to the income he/she earns, irrespective of his/her degree of control over 
the inputs involved in earning that income. 
In the US, believing effort to be rewarded implies an approximate 15 percentage point 
decrease in the probability of supporting the redistributive statement. In other ‘Neo-
European’ countries - Australia, New Zealand, and Canada – the decrease is of around 10 
percentage points. In the Southern European countries Cyprus, Spain, France, and 
Portugal, in the two former socialist countries Hungary and Czech Republic, and in Japan 
there are also statistically significant negative effort effects on the probability of 
agreement with the redistributive statement (ranging from 4 to 10 percentage points).
24
 In 
                                                 
23
 See for example the theoretical model in Alesina and Angeletos (2005).  
24
 For Canada, Cyprus, France, Hungary, and Japan a negative effect was confirmed using the one-sided test 
in Table A3, though the effect can only almost be rejected to equal zero at the ten percent level of 
significance using a two sided test (Figure 4).  
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other countries – the Scandinavian countries Denmark, Norway and Sweden, eastern and 
western Germany and Switzerland, the remaining four former socialist countries, and in 
Brazil, Chile, Ireland and the Philippines - however, the effects of believing that effort is 
rewarded are not statistically significant and do not stand out as large. This could be taken 
to indicate that in these countries effort is not to the same extent viewed as an input under 
individual control. Indeed, it is conceivable that depending on social background and 
other circumstances, individuals do not all have the same choice set regarding how much 
effort to exert. An alternative interpretation is that people in these countries are more 
concerned about equal outcomes, regardless of the degree of control they believe people 
have over important income determinants.  
Believing intelligence and skills to be rewarded  produces mixed results; in Denmark 
it implies an 11 percentage point increase in the probability of agreeing or strongly 
agreeing with the redistributive statement, whereas in Brazil, Canada, Cyprus, Latvia and  
the Czech Republic
25
 it comes with a decrease in the same probability in the range of 2 to 
14 percentage points. This could be taken to suggest country differences in the degree of 
responsibility assigned to this input, but could also indicate that the countries differ in the 
fairness ideals adhered to, with Danes being more concerned with equal outcomes and 
Brazilians, Canadians, Cypriots, Latvians and Czechs being more libertarian. In other 
countries the effect of believing intelligence and skills to be rewarded is not statistically 
different from zero.  
We formally test whether the effects of belief variables differ across countries using a 
number of log-likelihood ratio tests (see Table A2, Panel 2). First, a restricted model in 
which country differences are only allowed to affect the intercept is firmly rejected in 
favour of a model that allows different slopes of the belief parameters, thus confirming 
the suspected presence of cross-country heterogeneity in the belief effects. Next, we test if 
there is parameter heterogeneity with respect to the beliefs regarding each input 
separately. For all inputs, the hypothesis of homogenous effects can be safely rejected.   
 
3.2.3 Can the differences in beliefs and the differences in effects of these beliefs help 
explain cross-country variation in redistribution support?  
 
Let us now turn to the last stage where we address to what extent the identified 
differences in (1) beliefs and (2) the impacts of these beliefs can explain the large country 
variation observed in redistributive preferences. Previous literature suggests that 
differences in people’s beliefs are central in this respect (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005). 
To get an idea of the relative importance of differences in beliefs and differences in the 
effects of these beliefs for explaining cross-country variation in preferences for 
redistribution, we evaluate how the effect of belonging to a certain country changes as 
beliefs and beliefs-country interaction terms are added to the model. USA, the country 
hitherto most studied with regard to preferences for redistribution, and the country with 
the least support for redistribution controlling for other variables, is the reference country. 
To be more specific, we estimate the following three equations and focus on whether the 
parameters in φ  approach zero as we allow for differences in beliefs (2) and differences 
in the effects of these beliefs (3).  
 
                                                 
25
 In the Czech sample it cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level that the effect differs from zero using a 
two-sided test, but using a one-sided test it can be rejected that the effect is equal to or larger than zero at the 
5.5 level of significance.  
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Figure 9 shows the resulting country effects. 
 
<< FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE>> 
 
Adding the belief variables to the model marginally reduces the effect of being of a 
certain nationality.
 26
 Furthermore, the country effect with beliefs (Specification 2) always 
falls within the 95 percent confidence interval around the country effect without beliefs 
(Specification 1).
27
 Unexpectedly, differences in beliefs can thus, at most, explain a very 
small part of the cross-country variation in redistributive preferences.  
Allowing for heterogeneity in the effects of beliefs reduces country effects quite 
substantially (the exceptions are eastern and western Germany where it increases the 
country effect marginally).
28
 The effect of being Australian, Danish or Philippine (rather 
than American) almost disappears. The effect of being Canadian, Cypriot, Czech, 
Japanese, New Zealander, or Swedish is approximately halved. About one third of the 
effect of being Chilean, French, Irish, Latvian, Polish, or Swiss disappears, and roughly 
one fourth of that of being Hungarian, Portuguese, or Slovenian.
29
 Hence, as it seems, a 
relatively large part of many countries’ stronger support for redistribution (compared to 
the US) could be explained by people in these countries assigning a lower degree of 
responsibility to inputs believed to be important for income determination. However, for 
some countries, such as Brazil and Russia, different effects of holding certain beliefs 
about income determinants on preferences for redistribution does little to explain their 
stronger support for redistribution, and the stronger support for redistribution in Germany 
than in the US becomes, if anything, even more puzzling, considering that Germans 
seemingly assign a higher degree of responsibility to inputs believed to determine income. 
The conclusion we can draw from this is that while differences in beliefs on what 
causes income differences seem to be important for explaining within-country variation in 
redistributive preferences, they do little to explain between-country differences. 
Differences in the effects of holding certain beliefs, however, seem to be important for 
explaining between-country variation in redistributive preferences.  
 
4. Conclusions 
  
                                                 
26
 Comparing other countries with each other, the difference between their country effects (relative to the 
US) should not have been affected more than marginally either, since all changes in country effects are 
small and in the same direction. 
27
 The estimated country effects and their 95 % confidence intervals are available from the authors.  
28
 Comparing other countries with each other, the difference between their country effects (relative to the 
US) increases in some cases, but the fact remains that country effects decrease vis-à-vis the extreme low 
redistribution support case USA.  
29
 For eleven countries (Australia, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Japan, Philippines, 
Poland, Portugal and Sweden) the country effect with beliefs parameter heterogeneity (Specification 3) falls 
outside of the 95 percent confidence interval of country effects with homogenous (Specification 2) or no 
(Specification 1) beliefs. For four other countries (Hungary, Latvia, Russia, Slovenia) it falls outside of the 
confidence interval of the country effect with no beliefs and at the limit of the confidence interval of that 
with homogenous belief parameters, and for nine countries (Brazil, Canada, Germany (east), Germany 
(west), Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Switzerland) the country effect falls within the confidence 
intervals of the prior country effects. 
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The objective of this study was to explain variation in redistributive preferences, within as 
well as between countries, in terms of self-interest concerns and an input-based concept of 
fairness. The latter was captured by the effect of beliefs abut the causes of income 
differences. We included beliefs about income determinants arguably under varying 
degrees of individual control, stipulating that believing a ‘responsible’ factor to be 
important for determining income would imply less support for redistribution, whereas 
believing an input outside individual control to be an important income determinant 
should bring with it more support for redistribution. Importantly, we argued that these 
beliefs, and their effects, should vary with context. The country-comparative perspective 
was therefore central; we aimed to explain not only within-country but also between-
country variation in redistributive preferences. Two hypotheses were formulated and 
tested using data for 25 countries. 
Our first hypothesis suggested that both economic self-interest and an input-based 
fairness concept, where individuals judge the fairness of income determinants according 
to their perceived degree of ‘responsibility’, matter for redistributive preferences. This 
was supported by the data. In the pooled sample, relative income had a negative, although 
quite modest, impact on preferences for redistribution, and the effects of the variables 
capturing beliefs about the causes of income differences followed the hypothesised 
pattern familyc
skills
c
effort
c , 0
effort
c and 0
family
c . As stipulated, believing effort 
(a ‘responsible input’) to be rewarded in society had a negative impact on support for 
redistribution, whereas believing that family background (a  ‘arbitrary input’) is 
important for getting ahead was associated with stronger support for redistribution. Also, 
and as expected, the effect of believing that intelligence/skills (the input arguably most 
difficult to classify in terms of ‘responsibility’) are rewarded fell in-between those of 
believing family or effort to be important income determinants.  
On the whole, the country sub-sample estimations supported our hypothesis, but 
revealed considerable heterogeneity in terms of the magnitude and statistical significance 
of effects. A higher relative income was generally associated with less support for 
redistribution, but the size of the effect varied. In the countries where we found 
statistically significant belief effects, the family effects were positive and the effort effects 
negative, albeit varying considerably in magnitude. Moreover, and as hypothesised, the 
family effect was larger than the effort and intelligence/skills effects. Comparing the 
magnitudes of the effort and intelligence/skills effects, however, the results were mixed – 
we could not establish that the effect of believing the responsible input effort to be 
important is smaller than that of believing the more ambiguous input intelligence/skills to 
be so.  
Hence, whereas the aggregate pattern suggested that individuals base their preferences 
for redistribution on self-interest considerations as well as input-based fairness concerns, 
the country comparison revealed that this pattern is not necessarily universal.  
Our second hypothesis put forward that differences in both beliefs about income 
determinants, and in the effects of these beliefs, should contribute to explain the cross-
country variation in redistributive preferences. We could establish that there is 
considerable country variation in beliefs about income determinants, and that this 
variation often follows a pattern that would be expected judging from our input-based 
fairness concept and the observed country variation in redistribution support. Somewhat 
surprisingly, however, our analysis suggested that country differences in beliefs about 
income determinants, at best, could explain very little of the country variation in 
redistributive support.  
Turning to the effects of the belief variables, our results showed that these too vary 
significantly across countries. Believing that coming from a wealthy family is important 
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to get ahead in some countries had basically no effect while in others it involved an over 
20 percentage point increase in the probability of supporting redistribution. The effect of 
believing effort to be an important income determinant varied from being statistically 
non-discernible from zero to decreasing the probability of supporting redistribution with 
around 15 percentage points. With respect to believing intelligence/skills to be rewarded 
the results were mixed, with both negative and positive but in most cases statistically 
insignificant effects. Furthermore, our results suggested that this heterogeneity in belief 
effects is important for explaining country differences in redistribution support. With a 
few exceptions (Germany, Brazil and to some extent Russia), a quite substantial share of 
countries’ stronger support for redistribution relative to the US could be explained by 
people in these countries seemingly assigning a lower degree of responsibility to inputs 
believed to be important for income determination. So, while differences in beliefs on 
what causes income differences seem to be important for explaining within-country 
variation in redistributive preferences, they do little to explain between-country 
differences. Differences in the effects of holding certain beliefs, however, appear 
important for explaining between-country variation in redistributive preferences.  
Summing up, our findings indicate that self-interest considerations as well as input-
based fairness concerns contribute to explain redistributive preferences, but also that there 
is substantial country variation, in redistribution support, in key factors explaining 
redistribution support, as well as in the effects of these factors on redistribution support. In 
particular, looking at our results the country most studied in this field – the US – is quite 
an extreme case, displaying the lowest support for redistribution, the most positive views 
about the rewards to effort and intelligence/skills, and some of the strongest effects of our 
belief variables. This tells us that in trying to understand fairness-based and self-interested 
motivations behind preferences for redistribution we cannot focus on one country alone – 
we need to evaluate both within and between country variations.  
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Figures  
 
Figure 1: Share of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing with the redistributive statement
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 ’It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the difference in income between people with high 
incomes and those with low incomes’ 
 
Figure 2: Country variation in the effects of a higher relative income on support for redistribution  
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Based on ordered probit estimation of equation 1 for the country sub-samples. Presents the effects of a 
one median absolute deviation increase around the median in relative income on the probability of 
agreeing or strongly agreeing with the statement, ’It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the 
difference in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes’.  
*** indicates significance at the 1 % level, ** at 5 % and * at 10 % (in cases where the level of 
significance differed between the effect on the probability of agreeing and strongly agreeing with the 
redistributive statement, ***, ** and * refer to the significance level of the coefficient).  
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Figure 3: Country variation in the effects of holding the belief ’coming from a wealthy family is 
important to get ahead’ on support for redistribution  
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Based on ordered probit estimation of equation 1 for the country sub-samples. Presents the effects of 
believing it to be ‘essential’ or ‘very important’, rather than ‘not very important’ or ‘not important at 
all’, to come from a wealthy family to get ahead on the probability of agreeing or strongly agreeing with 
statement, ’It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the difference in income between people 
with high incomes and those with low incomes’.  
*** indicates significance at the 1 % level, ** at 5 % and * at 10 % (in cases where the level of 
significance differed between the effect on the probability of agreeing and strongly agreeing with the 
redistributive statement, ***, ** and * refer to the significance level of the coefficient).  
 
Figure 4: Country variation in the effects of believing ’effort is rewarded’ on support for redistribution  
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Based on ordered probit estimation of equation 1 for the country sub-samples. Presents the effects of 
agreeing or strongly agreeing rather than disagreeing or strongly disagreeing to the statement ’In 
[country] people get rewarded for their effort’ on the probability of agreeing or strongly agreeing with 
statement, ’It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the difference in income between people 
with high incomes and those with low incomes’.  
*** indicates significance at the 1 % level, ** at 5 % and * at 10 % (in cases where the level of 
significance differed between the effect on the probability of agreeing and strongly agreeing with the 
redistributive statement, ***, ** and * refer to the significance level of the coefficient).  
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Figure 5: Country variation in the effects of believing ’intelligence/skills is rewarded’ on support for 
redistribution  
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Based on ordered probit estimation of equation 1 for the country sub-samples. Presents the effects of 
agreeing or strongly agreeing rather than disagreeing or strongly disagreeing to the statement ’In 
[country] people get rewarded for their intelligence and skills’ on the probability of agreeing or strongly 
agreeing with statement, ’It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the difference in income 
between people with high incomes and those with low incomes’.  
*** indicates significance at the 1 % level, ** at 5 % and * at 10 % (in cases where the level of 
significance differed between the effect on the probability of agreeing and strongly agreeing with the 
redistributive statement, ***, ** and * refer to the significance level of the coefficient).  
 
Figure 6: Share of respondents believing that it is essential or very important to be from a wealthy family 
to get ahead. 
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Figure 7: Share of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing to the statement ‘In [country] people get 
rewarded for their effort’ 
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Figure 8: Share of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing to the statement ‘In [country] people get 
rewarded for intelligence and skills’.  
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Figure 9: Explaining country variation in redistributive preferences with differences in beliefs and 
differences in effects of beliefs.  
Country dummy effects on the probability to agree or strongly agree with the redistributive statement, 
from ordered probit estimations with the following explanatory variables (see Table A1 for more 
detail): 
Spec. 1: country dummies + other controls 
Spec. 2: country dummies + other controls + belief variables 
Spec. 3: country dummies + other controls + belief variables + belief*country   
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Tables 
  
Table 1: Pooled sample marginal effects
1
 on probability of agreeing with the redistributive statement
2
 
Marginal effect on choosing 
response category: 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree Strongly  
agree 
Believe wealthy family important -0.018*** -0,035*** -0,029*** -0,003*** 0,086*** 
 0.001 0,003 0,003 0,001 0,007 
No strong family belief -0.002 -0,004 -0,003 0,000 0,009 
 0.001 0,003 0,002 0,000 0,006 
Believe effort rewarded 0.013*** 0,024*** 0,019*** -0,002*** -0,054*** 
 0.002 0,004 0,003 0,001 0,008 
No strong effort belief 0.011*** 0,019*** 0,015*** -0,002*** -0,043*** 
 0.002 0,004 0,003 0,001 0,008 
Believe intell./skills rewarded 0.006*** 0,011*** 0,008*** 0,000 -0,024*** 
 0.002 0,003 0,003 0,000 0,008 
No strong intell./skill belief 0.005** 0,009** 0,007** -0,001 -0,020** 
 0.002 0,004 0,003 0,000 0,008 
Relative income 0.002*** 0,004*** 0,003*** 0,000 -0,008*** 
 (0.000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,001) 
Age -0.001*** -0,002*** -0,002*** 0,000 0,006*** 
 (0.000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,002) 
Female -0.012*** -0,022*** -0,017*** 0,000 0,051*** 
 (0.001) (0,002) (0,002) (0,000) (0,005) 
Higher education 0.012*** 0,022*** 0,017*** -0,002*** -0,048*** 
 (0.002) (0,003) (0,002) (0,001) (0,007) 
Father has higher education 0.010*** 0,018*** 0,014*** -0,002*** -0,041*** 
 (0.002) (0,003) (0,002) (0,001) (0,007) 
Upper class 0.027*** 0,043*** 0,031*** -0,011*** -0,090*** 
 (0.003) (0,004) (0,003) (0,002) (0,008) 
Working class -0.016*** -0,030*** -0,025*** -0,002** 0,074*** 
 (0.001) (0,003) (0,002) (0,001) (0,007) 
Inequality necessary for prosperity 0.015*** 0,026*** 0,020*** -0,003*** -0,058*** 
 (0.002) (0,003) (0,002) (0,001)      (0,006) 
The estimation also includes 24 country dummies. 
Observations 20250     
*** indicates significance at the 1 % level, ** at 5 % and * at 10 %. 
1
 Dummy variable effects (all except for relative income and age) are for a discrete 0-1 change (for 
reference categories, see Table A1). The relative income effect is for a one median absolute deviation 
increase around the median, and the age effect is for an increase from 40 to 50 (approximately equivalent 
to a one standard deviation change around the mean).   
2
 ’It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the difference in income between people with high 
incomes and those with low incomes’. 
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 APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: Variable description  
Variable Description 
Preferences for 
redistribution   
The response to the statement, ’It is the responsibility of the government to reduce 
the difference in income between people with high incomes and those with low 
incomes’; 1 if respondent chooses strongly disagree, 2 if respondent chooses 
disagree, 3 if respondent chooses neither agree nor disagree, 4 if respondent 
chooses agree and 5 if respondent chooses strongly agree. 
Belief variables  
Believe wealthy family 
important 
 1 if respondent answers essential or very important to the question, ‘For getting 
ahead, how important is coming from a wealthy family?’; 0 otherwise. 
No strong family belief 
 
1 if respondent answers fairly important to the question, ’For getting ahead, how 
important is coming from a wealthy family?’; 0 otherwise.  
Believe family not 
important 
1 if respondent answers not very important or not important at all to the question, 
‘For getting ahead, how important is coming from a wealthy family?’; 0 
otherwise.  
Used as reference category in estimation. 
Believe intelligence 
and skills rewarded 
1 if respondent responds agree or strongly agree to the statement, ’In [country] 
people get rewarded for their intelligence and skills’; 0 otherwise. 
No strong intelligence/ 
skills belief 
1 if respondent responds neither agree nor disagree to the statement, ’'In 
[country] people get rewarded for their intelligence and skills’; 0 otherwise. 
 Believe intelligence 
and skills not rewarded 
1 if respondent responds disagree or strongly disagree to the statement, ‘In 
[country] people get rewarded for their intelligence and skills’; 0 otherwise. Used 
as reference category in estimation. 
Believe effort rewarded  1 if respondent responds agree or strongly agree to the statement, ’In [country] 
people get rewarded for their effort’; 0 otherwise. 
No strong effort belief  1 if respondent responds neither agree nor disagree to the statement, ’'In 
[country] people get rewarded for their effort’; 0 otherwise.  
Believe effort not 
rewarded 
1 if respondent responds disagree or strongly disagree to the statement, ’'In 
[country] people get rewarded for their effort’; 0 otherwise.  
Used as reference category in estimation. 
Self-interest variable  
Relative income  Household income per adult equivalent divided by the country sample average. A 
common country average was used for eastern and western Germany. 
Control variables  
Age Age in years  
Female 1 if female; 0 else 
Higher education 1 if respondent has some post secondary school education; 0 else 
Father has higher 
education 
1 if respondent’s father has completed secondary school; 0 else 
Upper class 1 if respondent’s self reported class is upper class or upper middle class; 0 else 
Working class 1 if respondent’s self reported class is working class or lower class; 0 else 
Middle class  1 if respondent’s self reported class is middle class; 0 else.  
Used as reference category in estimation. 
Inequality necessary for 
prosperity 
1 if respondent respond agree or strongly agree to the statement, ‘Large 
differences in income are necessary for [country’s] prosperity’; O otherwise 
Country dummies 1 if respondent belongs to the country in question; 0 else 
USA used as reference category in estimations. 
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Table A2: Log-likelihood ratio tests  
Panel 1: Joint importance of belief variables 
Restricted model Unrestricted model LR chi-sq. p-value 
Pooled, excluding belief vars. Pooled sample benchmark 295.80 0.000 
Australia, excluding belief vars. Australia benchmark 36.99 0.000 
Brazil, excluding belief vars. Brazil benchmark 17.54 0.008 
Canada ,excluding belief vars. Canada benchmark 22.39 0.001 
Chile, excluding belief vars. Chile benchmark 8.97 0.175 
Cyprus, excluding belief vars. Cyprus benchmark 51.27 0.000 
Czech Rep., excluding belief vars. Czech Rep. benchmark 28.52 0.000 
Denmark, excluding belief vars. Denmark benchmark 21.27 0.002 
France, excluding belief vars. France benchmark 15.84 0.015 
Germany (west) , excluding belief vars. Germany (west) benchmark  15.21 0.019 
Germany (east) , excluding belief vars. Germany (east) benchmark 16.92 0.010 
Hungary, excluding belief vars. Hungary benchmark 15.96 0.014 
Ireland, excluding belief vars. Ireland benchmark 11.97 0.063 
Japan, excluding belief vars. Japan benchmark 12.37 0.054 
Latvia, excluding belief vars. Latvia benchmark 19.10 0.004 
New Zealand, excluding belief vars. New Zealand benchmark 20.86 0.002 
Norway, excluding belief vars. Norway benchmark 20.21 0.003 
Philippines, excluding belief vars. Philippines benchmark 26.03 0.000 
Poland, excluding belief vars. Poland benchmark 35.35 0.000 
Portugal, excluding belief vars. Portugal benchmark 21.00 0.002 
Russia, excluding belief vars. Russia benchmark 21.14 0.002 
Slovenia, excluding belief vars. Slovenia  7.43 0.283 
Spain, excluding belief vars. Spain benchmark 20.21 0.003 
Sweden, excluding belief vars. Sweden benchmark 17.73 0.007 
Switzerland, excluding belief vars. Switzerland benchmark 9.44 0.150 
USA, excluding belief vars. USA benchmark 38.95 0.000 
Panel 2: Tests of parameter homogeneity 
Pooled sample benchmark Allow belief parameters to vary for 
each belief and each country 
247.03 0.000 
Pooled sample benchmark Allow family belief parameters to 
vary for each country 
76.78 0.005 
Pooled sample benchmark Allow effort belief parameters to 
vary for each country 
108.77 0.000 
Pooled sample benchmark Allow intelligence and skills belief 
parameters to vary for each country 
98.55 0.000 
Based on ordered probit estimations where the dependent variable is the answers to the statement, ‘It is the 
responsibility of the government to reduce the difference in income between people with high incomes and 
those with low incomes’, ranging from 1 for strongly disagree to 5 for strongly agree. The belief variables 
are responses to whether effort and intelligence/skills are rewarded, and to whether it is important to be 
from a wealthy family to get ahead. These and other explanatory variables in the benchmark model are 
described in Table A1.   
 
 
 
Table A3: One sided tests of coefficients from ordered probit estimation
1
 of the probability to agree with 
the redistributive statement
2
 
Sample P-value of testing the null hypothesis: 
 FAM
3
 <=0 EFF
4
 >=0    SKI 
5
>= FAM  EFF >= SKI  EFF >= FAM  
Pooled 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.063 0.000 
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Australia  0.000 0.019 0.001 0.182 0.000 
Brazil  0.098 0.880 0.014 0.957 0.507 
Canada  0.270 0.064 0.011 0.704 0.055 
Chile  0.124 0.200 0.126 0.457 0.080 
Cyprus  0.035 0.036 0.001 0.646 0.005 
Czech rep. 0.386 0.011 0.086 0.309 0.023 
Denmark  0.000 0.385 0.131 0.045 0.001 
France  0.009 0.070 0.032 0.207 0.003 
Germany (west) 0.176 0.173 0.094 0.504 0.091 
Germany (east) 0.012 0.359 0.069 0.470 0.048 
Hungary  0.023 0.054 0.122 0.112 0.008 
Ireland  0.030 0.243 0.004 0.772 0.075 
Japan  0.013 0.097 0.009 0.495 0.005 
Latvia  0.002 0.681 0.000 0.936 0.085 
New Zealand  0.012 0.020 0.013 0.262 0.000 
Norway  0.000 0.658 0.000 0.768 0.001 
Philippines 0.000 0.837 0.004 0.830 0.057 
Poland  0.000 0.452 0.006 0.245 0.000 
Portugal  0.008 0.016 0.175 0.043 0.001 
Russia  0.001 0.224 0.033 0.389 0.017 
Slovenia  0.450 0.269 0.270 0.490 0.280 
Spain  0.145 0.001 0.391 0.017 0.001 
Sweden  0.001 0.541 0.013 0.590 0.024 
Switzerland  0.038 0.223 0.021 0.589 0.052 
USA  0.000 0.006 0.005 0.068 0.000 
1 
 Based on estimation of equation 1. 
2 ‘It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the difference in income between people with high 
incomes and those with low incomes’ 
3 
FAM=coefficient of ‘Believe wealthy family important’  
4
 EFF=coefficient of ‘Believe effort rewarded’  
5
 SKI=coefficient of ‘Believe intelligence and skills rewarded’  
 
Table A4: Relative income effects
1
 on the probability of different responses to the question ‘For getting 
ahead, how important is coming from a wealthy family?’ 
Sample 
Not at all 
important 
Not very 
important 
Fairly 
important 
Very 
important  Essential 
Pooled (25 countries) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
Pooled (20 countries)
2
 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
Australia 0.003 0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 
Brazil 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
Canada -0.009 -0.005 0.006 0.006 0.002 
Chile -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Cyprus -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 
Czech rep. -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Denmark 0.003 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 
France -0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 
Germany (west) 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
Germany (east) -0.004 -0.006 -0.000 0.007 0.003 
Hungary 0.004** 0.006** 0.000 -0.004** -0.006** 
Ireland 0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 
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Japan -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
Latvia 0.004** 0.003** 0.001* -0.005** -0.004** 
New Zealand -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Norway 0.002 0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.000 
Philippines 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
Poland 0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.002 -0.005 
Portugal -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 0.003 0.007 
Russia 0.003* 0.003* 0.001* -0.002* -0.004* 
Slovenia -0.004 -0.004 0.001 0.004 0.002 
Spain 0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.005 -0.003 
Sweden 0.002 0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
Switzerland -0.006 -0.007 0.005 0.005 0.003 
USA 0.007 0.005 -0.004 -0.007 -0.002 
The effects are from ordered probit estimations where the dependent variable is the answer to the 
question ‘For getting ahead, how important is coming from a wealthy family?’, and the explanatory 
variables included are: relative income, age, female, higher education, father has higher education, 
upper class, working class, inequality necessary for prosperity, and country dummies. 
*** indicates significance at the 1 % level, ** at 5 % and * at 10 %. 
1
 Measures the effects of a relative income increase of one median absolute deviation increase around the 
median. 
2 
Brazil, France, Hungary, Latvia, and Russia excluded. 
 
Table A5: Relative income effects
1
 on the probability of agreeing with the statement, ‘In [country] 
people get rewarded for their effort’. 
Sample 
Strongly 
disagree Disagree Neither Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Pooled (25 countries) 0.001** 0.001** 0.000** -0.001** -0.001** 
Pooled (20 countries)
2
 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
Australia -0.000 -0.003 -0.002 0.004 0.001 
Brazil 0.011*** 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.008*** 
Canada -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 0.006 0.001 
Chile 0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
Cyprus 0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
Czech rep, -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Denmark -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
France -0.008*** -0.011*** 0.005*** 0.012*** 0.002** 
Germany (west) -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.004 0.000 
Germany (east) -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.000 
Hungary -0.010** 0.000 0.005** 0.003** 0.002** 
Ireland 0.001 0.005 0.001 -0.006 -0.001 
Japan 0.003 0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.003 
Latvia 0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
New Zealand -0.002 -0.008 -0.001 0.008 0.003 
Norway 0.002 0.004 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 
Philippines 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
Poland -0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 
Portugal -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 
Russia -0.007* 0.003* 0.002* 0.001* 0.001* 
Slovenia 0.006 0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 
Spain -0.008** -0.010** 0.001 0.014** 0.003** 
Sweden -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.001 
Switzerland -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.001 
USA -0.001 -0.005 -0.005 0.006 0.005 
The effects are from ordered probit estimations where the dependent variable is the answer to the 
question ‘In [country] people get rewarded for their effort’, and the explanatory variables included are: 
Page 29 of 29
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 28 
relative income, age, female, higher education, father has higher education, upper class, working class, 
inequality necessary for prosperity, and country dummies. 
*** indicates significance at the 1 % level, ** at 5 % and * at 10 %. 
1
 Measures the effects of a relative income increase of one median absolute deviation increase around 
the median.
  
2 
Brazil, France, Hungary, Latvia, and Russia are excluded. 
 
Table A6: Relative income effects
1
 on the probability of agreeing with the statement, ‘In [country] 
people get rewarded for their intelligence and skills’. 
Estimation sample 
Strongly 
disagree Disagree Neither Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Pooled (25 countries) 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,000 -0,000 
Pooled (20 countries)
 2
 0,000 0,001 0,000 -0,001 -0,000 
Australia 0,000 0,003 0,002 -0,004 -0,002 
Brazil 0,003* 0,001* 0,000 -0,001* -0,003* 
Canada -0,002 -0,008 -0,005 0,011 0,004 
Chile 0,001 0,001 0,000 -0,001 -0,001 
Cyprus 0,001 0,001 -0,000 -0,001 -0,000 
Czech rep, -0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
Denmark 0,002 0,003 0,003 -0,003 -0,005 
France -0,004* -0,009* 0,000 0,011** 0,002* 
Germany (west) -0,000 -0,001 -0,000 0,001 0,000 
Germany (east) 0,000 0,002 0,002 -0,003 -0,001 
Hungary -0,001 -0,001 0,000 0,001 0,000 
Ireland 0,002* 0,013* 0,006* -0,015* -0,006* 
Japan 0,002 0,002 0,003 -0,003 -0,004 
Latvia -0,007** -0,002** 0,003** 0,005** 0,001** 
New Zealand 0,000 0,001 0,001 -0,002 -0,001 
Norway 0,003** 0,009** 0,001* -0,012** -0,002** 
Philippines -0,001* -0,002* -0,002* 0,001* 0,004* 
Poland -0,002 -0,003 0,001 0,003 0,001 
Portugal 0,006 0,004 0,000 -0,006 -0,004 
Russia -0,007** 0,002** 0,002** 0,002** 0,001* 
Slovenia 0,001 0,001 -0,000 -0,001 -0,000 
Spain -0,000 -0,000 -0,000 0,000 0,000 
Sweden 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,000 -0,000 
Switzerland -0,001 -0,004 -0,008 0,010 0,003 
USA -0,001 -0,005 -0,006 0,004 0,008 
The effects are from ordered probit estimations where the dependent variable is the answer to the 
question ‘In [country] people get rewarded for their effort’, and the explanatory variables included are: 
relative income, age, female, higher education, father has higher education, upper class, working class, 
inequality necessary for prosperity, and country dummies. 
*** indicates significance at the 1 % level, ** at 5 % and * at 10 %. 
1
 Measures the effects of a relative income increase of one median absolute deviation increase around 
the median. 
2
Brazil, France, Hungary, Latvia, and Russia are excluded. 
 
 
 
 
 
